In those early days of the Depression, Fisher persistently provided a basic orientation of monetarism in analysis and in policy prescription. "The chief direct cause of the depression"2 was the one-third reduction of the money stock between 1929 and 1933, and "the only sure and rapid recovery is through monetary means."3 He provided a stream of detailed proposals: devalue the dollar, most immediately in connection with raising prices generally; pursue aggressive open market operations in order to increase the money stock; provide governmental guarantee of bank deposits; use dated stamp scrip in order to maintain or increase monetary velocity; and, rather outside the realm of monetary policy, subsidize firms that increase their hiring of labor for minimum periods.4
In the midst of this intellectual and proselytizing activity, Fisher was introduced to the reform proposal to require 100 percent reserves against demand deposits in commercial banks. He was not an instant convertnot quite-but within a few months he had eagerly adopted the proposal and become its most enthusiastic and conspicuous proponent. 
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. 8 The memorandum, directed almost entirely to banking and supervisory institutional and procedural concerns, with little attention to policy objectives and criteria, was located in the Roosevelt Library and made available to me by Ronnie J. Phillips.
9 Letter from Cox, Director, Douglas, Hart, Knight, Mints, Schultz, and Simons to L. D. Edie, March 15, 1933 (Chicago). The authors caution that "this document is strictly for your private use; and we request that every precaution be taken against mention of it in the press. The program defined in the statement is one which we believe to be sound, even ideal, in principle. What its merits may be, in the light of political consideration, we was done by Simons, who "got started toward this scheme" some ten years earlier, in "trying to figure out the possibilities of applying the principle of the English Act of 1844 to the deposits as well as to the notes of private banks." "This Act would have been an almost perfect solution of the banking problem," Simons added, "if bank issue could have been confined to notes."'o Later, Fisher was to allude many times to the English precedent, partly to emphasize that "the 100 per cent proposal is the opposite of radical."" Fisher was one of the few to receive the memorandum from Simons and his colleagues. As summarized in a separate letter from Simons, "the purely banking features of our scheme" could be explained largely in terms of the objective of "abolition of private credit as an element in the circulating media-concentration of complete and direct control over the quantity of media in the hands of the central monetary authority.'12 Fisher responded immediately and at length, expressing delight that "the economists of the University of Chicago are taking a definite and concerted initiative in regard to plans for getting us out of the depression." Even if some of the proposals were "impractical . . . at this time, I think it ought to be practical to at least divorce the demand deposit business from investment business."'' 13 Fisher did not at that time embrace the 100 percent reserve proposal. Even five months later, in August 1933, he did not allude to it in a long conversation with the president or in material then submitted to the president. It was Henry Wallace, secretary of agriculture, who apparently first called the president's attention to the idea, writing to him a few days after distribution of the paper that, "the memorandum from the Chicago economists which I gave you at the Cabinet meeting . . is really awfully good and I hope that you or Secretary [of the Treasury William] Woodin will have the time and energy to study it."'4 The earliest available evifrankly do not know. We are sensible, moreover, of an obligation not to broadcast publicly any statement which might undermine confidence in Administration measures, or impair their chances of successful operation. On the other hand, we feel, that the statement may merit deliberate consideration, among people of interests like our own; also, that it may suggest measures which might usefully be incorporated in other, and perhaps less impractical, schemes. Moreover, most of us suspect that measures at least as drastic and 'dangerous' as those we describe can hardly be avoided, except temporarily, in any event. Our government has, in a significant sense, allowed the commercial banks to usurp its primary function of controlling the currency. Bank credit has become the predominant element in our circulating medium. Until the Civil War we tried "free banking" with respect to note issue; at present we are still trying "free banking" with respect to deposit currency. The latter system, like the former, gives us an unreliable and unhomogeneous medium; and it gives us a regulation or manipulation of currency which is totally perverse. Money is created when it should be destroyed, and destroyed when it should be created. Our much heralded achievements in control (witness the Federal Reserve System), being designed to yield greater "elasticity" of credit, have served only to aggravate the underlying difficulty. 
II
The book, 100% Money, was published in April 1935. For Fisher, this was no academic exercise, nor was it designed merely to stimulate scholarly discussion of possible reforms. The substance of the book reflected fundamental concerns and provided the best hope of salvation. The "main point" of the plan, he emphasized in correspondence, was that it "would prevent a boom, but by the same token ..., it would prevent a depression."'31 "[T]o my mind, it, more than any other proposal, will help conserve our capitalist system and prevent banking from becoming nationalized.' '32 Fisher immediately sent a copy of the book to the president. A covering letter stressed both the economic urgency and the political shrewdness of adoption of the reserve proposal:33
Frankly, I am terribly disappointed at the slowness of your monetary policies. Your silver policy is helping because it is creating new money but the 100% money plan could get us out of the depression far faster and keep us out with far greater certainty than any other plan, to say nothing of getting the government largely out of debt to boot.
Incidentally, it would solve your major political problems and bring Father Coughlin into camp again. To my mind, it would be the master stroke of your administration.... I wish to stress with all the earnestness I can the importance of your giving this matter your personal and careful attention. I know nothing which seems to me half as important for you at this time. reserve system," with commercial banks destroying and creating money through lending and investing activity. "Under the 100% reserve system, on the other hand, no action of the banks could alter the circulating medium in the least." The system could be introduced-or, as Fisher put it, reintroduced-with little disturbance by allowing initially held government bonds to be counted as reserves, with the government ready to purchase with "cash" such bonds from the banks at par. In addition to treating such bonds as reserves, banks could borrow "new paper money" from the government in order to increase reserves to 100 percent. With demand deposits thereafter subject to full reserves, they would be guaranteed, or insured, without limit. And there would be no panic runs on banks." The money stock would be altered over time, not by commercial First, there were those who, while sympathetic to the scheme, found their attention diverted and their efforts diluted by additional aspects of overall recovery and reform. They put less weight, both relatively and absolutely, than did Fisher on the reserve proposal, and they were sometimes irritated by what they deemed to be exaggerated claims on behalf of the proposal. Second, they found the notion of "money" to be more subtle and its quantitative control to be more complex than Fisher's representations allowed. If one kind of the public's liquid assets is subjected to full reserves, then other assets, not so closely regulated, may assume some of the monetary functions, with little being accomplished other than increasing transactions costs.
Third, Fisher's attention was directed much more toward restructuring banking institutions than toward elucidating the monetary policy to be pursued after inauguration of the institutional revision. Even if we establish that money is important, and even if we adequately identify money and maintain the uniqueness of its moneyness, by what rule shall the optimal quantity of money and its rate of change be determined? Are the techniques of implementation of the rule adequate? And will unforeseen and largely uncontrolled changes in monetary velocity subvert efforts of stabilization that might otherwise be effective?
Finally, acknowledging that the Fisher plan called for a fundamental revision of financial arrangements, were the probable gains sufficient to warrant the attendant concerns and costs? And might all or at least the bulk of the gains be attained with alternative tactics that would be less unsettling?
Fisher did not wholly ignore any of these questions. But his arguments were not sufficiently persuasive in the arena of "practical" proposals, where even imagination and zeal do not invariably win the field of debate and policy determination quickly and easily. At the time, what most caught the fancy of politicians and professors was not seemingly arcane monetary analyses and banking proposals but the income analyses and fiscal proposals associated mainly with J. M. Keynes. Still, seeds of intuition and insight planted long ago sometimes-after patient nurturing by other able cultivators-can bear useful fruit.
concern involving 100 percent reserves has been stimulated by the financial fiasco of the past dozen years, with full reserves a possibly attractive substitute for guarantee of deposits. See Robert E. Litan, What Should Banks Do? (1987). Extensive historical work on banking reform in the 1930s and later is being conducted by Ronnie J. Phillips.
